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Introduction
As is the case in almost every European country, company law in
the Netherlands is based on the theory that every individual legal
entity ± in the Netherlands usually NVs and BVs ± has an
independent economic interest which serves as the primary and
decisive guideline for the actions of the board of management.
The rule applies for companies that operate as a separate com-
mercial entity but also for operating companies and holding
companies that form part of a larger group. The interests of the
individual group company do not always correspond with, or are
not per se parallel to, the interests of the group as a whole. In this
article I refer to this basic premise in short as the principle of
autonomy of interests.
This principle impacts on various legal issues pertaining to
the relationship between a parent company and its subsidiary. In
the first place, it affects the question of whether there is a
hierarchical relationship between these two group companies.
Can the parent company issue instructions which the directors
of the subsidiary are obliged to follow? Does the parent company
have the right to issue instructions concerning matters that are
typically the responsibility of the management, such as the
dismissal of employees, investments and public relations? Under
existing Dutch company law it is generally assumed that it does
not.1
The principle of autonomy of interests also has an impact on
the application of the doctrine of ultra vires. The company's
objects as defined in its articles of association determine in part
the scope of the activities within which directors can represent
the company. Under Dutch law, under certain circumstances
ultra vires can be successfully invoked by the company against
third parties (Article 2:7 of the Netherlands Civil Code (NCC) in
conjunction with Article 9 (1) of the 1st EC Company Law
Directive). The company is then not bound by the relevant
juridical act. However, under Dutch law the company's objects
must also be interpreted in light of the interests of the company
and its associated business.2 There are even authors who defend
the position that a juridical act that manifestly conflicts with the
interests of the company is ultra vires even if that juridical act is
specified verbatim in the objects in the articles of association.3 In
other words, according to this view, on which the Supreme Court
has not in fact ever expressed an opinion, even a broad defini-
tion of the company's objects does not help. According to this
view, under extreme circumstances the principle of autonomy of
interests derogates from the verbatim text of the company's
objects. This might be the case, for instance, if security is pro-
vided for the debt of a group company in the context of group
financing at a time when that security is soon expected to be
called in, with the likely consequence that the company from
whom the security is recovered will become bankrupt. It is not
surprising that although ultra vires is seldom successfully
invoked in case law it is an instrument that still always forces
Dutch lawyers to observe extreme caution and to formulate
extensive caveats when rendering a legal opinion. Of course there
would be less need for such cautiousness if as a rule the interests
of the individual subsidiary would be deemed to run con-
currently with the group's interests.
Finally, the principle of autonomy of interests plays an
important role in the application and scope of the doctrine of
conflict of interest. By contrast with most other European coun-
tries, the rules on conflict of interest in the Netherlands, as set out
in Article 2:256 NCC4 are part of the doctrine of representation of
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1 For an extensive discussion of this point, with reference to relevant case law and literature, see Bartman/Dorresteijn, Van het concern, Kluwer-Deventer, 6th ed., 2006, Chapter
IV, pp. 81-98.
2 Supreme Court, 20 September 1996, NJ 1997, 149 (Playland).
3 Van Schilfgaarde/Winter, Van the BV en the NV, Kluwer-Deventer, 14th ed., 2006. p. 176. Also on this point, Th.A.L. Kliebisch, (Sombere) overpeinzingen bij het haardvuur, in
the collection 10 jaar JOR, alsnog geannoteerd, Sdu-The Hague, pp. 149-155 and C.J. Jager, Doeloverschrijding en concernfinanciering, Vermogensrechtelijke annotaties 2007/1,
pp. 5-21.
4 In this article I refer only to the legal provisions relating to Dutch private companies and not to the generally identical provisions for public companies.
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a legal person. If that legal provision applies, the company was not
duly represented and is therefore in principle not bound by the
relevant juridical act. As in the case of ultra vires, if conflict of
interest is successfully invoked it can have an effect on third
parties, which is what makes it such a dangerous legal instrument.
The result could be, for example, that a mortgage issued by a
subsidiary as security for a debt of its parent is null and void if the
subsidiary was represented by the parent in its capacity as
director of the subsidiary when the security was provided. As a
consequence here too we see that in practice lawyers are ± and
should be ± extremely cautious when giving an opinion on conflict
of interest in relation to a Dutch company.
In a sense the authority to issue instructions, ultra vires and
conflict of interest are `Siamese triplets' bound together by the
`umbilical cord' of the traditional principle of autonomy of
interests, which also applies for the individual subsidiary.5
Recent developments in Dutch company law seem to reveal a
shift in this situation however. These changes have been initiated
by the legislature but also spring from the case law of the
Supreme Court. It is a shift from the principle of autonomy of
interests to the principle of concurrence of interests as the basic
guideline for deciding on disputes between companies within a
group. The effects of this important shift will be felt mainly in
the area of advocacy. I will now explain these changes and their
consequences.
Power to issue instructions
As already mentioned, up to now it has been assumed that a
parent company does not have the power to issue binding
instructions to its subsidiary, on the grounds of its shareholding
or otherwise, on matters that are typically reserved to the
directors.6 The law only allows for a clause to be inserted in the
subsidiary's articles of association giving the parent company
power to instruct it on general lines of the policy to be pursued
(Article 2: 239 (4) NCC), but no one knows precisely what that
means and how these general lines should be distinct from
concrete and detailed instructions in the field of day to day
management. However, this situation is likely to change shortly
following intervention by the legislature. The above quoted
clause will be amended by the impending legislation designed to
simplify the legal rules governing private companies and make
them more flexible and will then read as follows:
The articles of association may provide that the directors must
behave in accordance with the instructions of another body of
the company. The directors are obliged to follow the instruc-
tions unless they are in conflict with the interests of the
company and of its business.7
In the Explanatory Memorandum the notes to this clause state
that if such a provision is included in the articles of association
the directors of the subsidiary must not slavishly follow the
instructions of the parent company and must continue to assess
those instructions in light of the interests of the subsidiary.
Nevertheless, this provision does mark a significant swing in the
relationship between the parent company and its subsidiary,
especially in the Netherlands where the legal form of a subsidiary
tends to be that of a private company. After all, it is clear that if
such a provision is included in the subsidiary's articles of
association the directors are as a rule legally obliged to follow the
instructions of central group management. That turns the
existing situation upside down, since the primary consideration
of the subsidiary's directors in the weighing up of interests is no
longer the interests of the subsidiary but rather those of the
group as a whole, as formulated and laid out by the group
management. The interests of the subsidiary now serve as just a
correction factor for extreme situations in which compliance
with the group management's instructions is likely and mani-
festly to threaten the sub's identity or even continuity. Another
way of putting it is that, according to the ± albeit optional ±
provisions of the bill, the interests of the subsidiary are in theory
assumed to be concurrent with the group's interests, as defined
by the group management, unless the directors of the subsidiary
argue and prove the contrary in the specific case. Or to put it yet
another way, the traditional principle of autonomy of interests is
replaced ± or at least may be replaced in the articles of asso-
ciation of the subsidiary when the bill becomes law ± by the
principle of concurrence of interests.
As already mentioned, this change in the point of departure
will impact mainly on the obligation to furnish evidence and the
allocation of the burden of proof in disputes between a parent
company and its subsidiary.8 After all, whereas in the current
situation the group management will have to argue and, when
disputed, demonstrate in such case that the group interest is
specifically and disproportionately prejudiced by failure to fol-
low the instructions, if the clause stipulated in the bill is included
in the subsidiary's articles of association it will be the directors
of the subsidiary that have to argue and prove that carrying out
the instruction will specifically and disproportionately prejudice
5 Although I realize that this metaphor reflects only a poor understanding of the physionomy of triplets, it suits my purposes well.
6 In practice disputes between a parent company and its subsidiary generally resolve themselves since the parent as majority shareholder of the subsidiary can always dismiss
the recalcitrant board of the subsidiary and replace it with another at the general meeting of shareholders, or threaten to do so (Article 2:244 NCC).
7 Private Company Law (Simplification and Flexibilization) Bill, Parliamentary Documents 31058.
8 There is in fact still the possibility that in the specific case the court will reverse the burden of proof on the grounds of reasonableness and fairness pursuant to the provisions
of Article 150 of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure. On the importance of the allocation of the burden of proof in intra-group legal disputes, see B. Wachter,
Concernrecht en bewijs(on)mogelijkheden, in Van Vennootschappelijk Belang, liber amicorum Prof. Mr. J.J.M. Maeijer, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink-Zwolle, 1988, pp. 379-391.
OCTOBER 2007, VOLUME 4, ISSUE 5 208 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW
the interests of the subsidiary. This is an important, and possibly
decisive, distinction, from a procedural perspective.
Conflict of interest
Conflict of interest has probably been the most controversial
topic in Dutch company law in recent years. For a brief review of
the current status of legislation and case law I refer to my
Country Status Report in European Company Law in February of
last year.9 In that survey I formulated a number of questions
concerning the interpretation of the relevant legal provision
(Article 2:256 NCC) which urgently needed to be answered for
the sake of legal certainty in commerce. The Supreme Court
recently answered two of these questions in its Bruil judgment.10
The questions were:
1. What if there is no pecuniary personal interest of the director
involved but merely a situation in which he also acts as
director ± executive or non executive ± or as a member of the
supervisory board of the contracting party, e.g. the bank that
grants a credit facility to the company? Does this purely
functional conflict of interest also fall within the scope of
Article 2:256 NCC?
2. If the mere possession of (the majority of) all shares in com-
bination with directorship in the same companies already
creates a conflict of interest as meant in Article 2:256 NCC,
should there not be an exception for group company relations?
In the Bruil judgment, the Supreme Court answered the first
question in the negative. A strictly functional conflict of interest
(in Dutch: kwalitatief tegenstrijdig belang) does not ± at least not
automatically ± fall within the scope of Article 2:256 NCC. In the
view of the Supreme Court there must always be an actual
situation in which the director `due to the existence of a personal
interest or through his involvement with another interest that is
not concurrent with that of the legal entity, must be deemed
incapable of safeguarding the interests of the company and its
business in a manner that may be expected of a trustworthy and
unprejudiced director'. 11
The Supreme Court gave a cautiously positive answer to the
second question. The relevant grounds of the judgment lead to
the conclusion that the group's interest must in any case not be
regarded as `an interest that is not concurrent with that of the
legal entity' as referred to above. In fact, in my view the Supreme
Court generally assumes that the interests of the parent and the
subsidiary are parallel for the purposes of the application of
Article 2:256 NCC. This is apparent from the following ground of
the judgment (no. 3.6):
`Particularly in those cases where a natural person is acting in
the capacity of director and shareholder of different companies
that constitute a group there will not readily be a conflict of
interest within the meaning of Article 2:256, precisely because
the intention of retaining (ultimate) control in the hands of
one person is to ensure that the weighing up of the interests of
all those group companies is concentrated in that person. After
all, the interests of the company and its business and the
interests of the relevant director and shareholder are then so
closely related that there will only be a conflict of interest in
exceptional circumstances.'
Although the Supreme Court formulates the principle of con-
currence of interests with respect to a director who is a natural
person, it is impossible to see why the same consideration would
not apply in the situation where a legal entity acts as director of
two or more other group companies. Briefly, the holding com-
pany/director will in principle also be deemed to be representing
an interest that is concurrent with that of its subsidiaries. In
other words, only if the directors of the subsidiary ± or the
administrator in the event of the company's bankruptcy ±
demonstrate in legal proceedings that this was not in fact the
case at the time of the disputed juridical act, the legal assump-
tion of concurrence of interests must then yield to the proof of a
conflict of interest. In this case it is not the legislature but the
Supreme Court that has imposed the burden of proof on the
directors of the subsidiary if they invoke a conflict of interest in
the relations within a group. However, here we see a similar shift
away from autonomy of interests to concurrence of interests.
This will necessarily translate into a change in the position of the
parent and its subsidiary during legal proceedings with respect
to the duty to furnish facts and the burden of proof.
Ultra vires
I have already referred to the close relationship that exists
between the theories of ultra vires and conflict of interest. This
relationship is due to the fact that under Dutch law the com-
pany's objects must be interpreted in light of its interests.
Judgments of the Supreme Court on conflict of interest, such as
the Bruil decision, are therefore also relevant for the subject of
ultra vires and the interpretation of Article 2:7 NCC, at least to
the extent that the Supreme Court pronounced findings and
decisions on aspects that are common to both doctrines in those
cases. Their application is then at least likely to be the same.12
Having said that, the Supreme Court's finding that signified a
shift from autonomy of interests to concurrence of interests
9 ECL, Volume 3, Issue 1, Report from the Netherlands, pp. 33-34
10 Supreme Court, 29 June 2007, JOR 2007/169 (Bruil). See my Country Status Report in ECL 2006/1 for the case stated and the contested judgment of the Appeal Court.
11 Ground 3.4
12 Cf. F.J.P. van den Ingh, Concernkrediet en solidariteit, Ondernemingsrecht 2005-9, pp. 318-319, footnote 8.
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referred to above was a finding of a general nature and as such
applies in full to disputes between a parent and its subsidiary
where ultra vires is invoked. Such an appeal to ultra vires will
generally be made by the administrator in the bankruptcy of a
subsidiary to prevent the lending bank from recovering the
securities that were provided.13 The shift in the basic principle
described above will also lead in such cases to a change in the
allocation of the obligation to furnish facts and the burden of
proof between the parties to the proceedings, subject to the
decision of the judge to allocate the burden of proof differently
on the grounds of reasonableness and fairness pursuant to
Article 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Once it is established
that the parties to the proceedings are in a relationship of
dependency within a group, as referred to by the Supreme Court
in the Bruil judgment, it is in principle up to the subsidiary to
argue and to prove that its interest ± and hence its object within
the meaning of Article 2:7 NCC ± was prejudiced by the disputed
juridical act in the specific case and that the legal assumption of
concurrence of interests must yield to that established fact.
Conclusion
This article is concerned with what is sometimes known as `intra-
group company law'. In other words, the law governing the legal
relationships between legal entities and their bodies, which
together constitute the economic and organizational entity that is
the group. The power of a parent company to issue instructions,
the circumstances under which actions of the subsidiary are ultra
vires and the existence of a conflict of interest between the parent
and subsidiary are issues that play a key role in intra-group
company law. These issues have traditionally been addressed on
the basis of the principle of autonomy of interests, in other words
the assumption that each subsidiary has an independent eco-
nomic interest that serves as the principal and decisive guideline
for the actions of its directors. In the Netherlands we have recently
observed a shift in this policy, in the sense that in the case law of
the Supreme Court the principle of autonomy of interests is gra-
dually being replaced by the principle of concurrence of interests.
This year's Bruil judgment illustrates this development. This
change in guiding principle leads to a reversal of the burden of
proof in disputes between a parent and its subsidiary. But also the
possibility of inserting a provision in the articles of association of
a subsidiary specifically allowing the parent company to issue
instructions, provided for in the pending law to simplify the law
on private companies and to make it more flexible, is a con-
tributing factor. This trend is bringing company law in the
Netherlands more closely into line with the economic reality of
relations within a group, which is a good thing.
13 Cf. R.J. Abendroth, Herfinanciering van noodlijdende ondernemingen, in the collection De financiering van de onderneming, published as Part 88 in the book series of the
Van der Heijden Instituut, Kluwer-Deventer, 2006, pp. 51-65.
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